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Actuarial Conservatism: Not in Public Sector 
Defined Benefit Pension Plans 
Brian A. Jones* 
Abstract 
Most actuaries tend to be conservative, and most, including this writer, 
probably would be happy to be so categorized. But actuarial conservatism 
may not be the best rule in defined benefit public sector pension plans. This 
paper argues that it is not appropriate for actuaries to employ conservatism 
assumptions in such public sector plans. 
Key words and phrases: assumptions, risk, funding, generational equity 
1 Introduction 
Actuarial conservatism in the valuation of pension plans1 manifests 
itself in two basic and related areas: (i) selection of actuarial assump-
tions; and (ii) recommendations of contributions where the particular 
* Brian A. Jones has an MA in mathematics from Oxford University, England, and 
a law degree. He is an enrolled actuary and a member of a number of actuarial or-
ganizations and of the New York and D.C. Bars. He recently received an LL.M. (with 
distinction) from the Law Faculty of Leicester University, England. 
Mr. Jones's address is: 10 Clinton Street, Brooklyn NY 11201, USA. 
IThroughout this paper, pension plan will mean a defined benefit plan and public 
sector plan will mean a governmental plan as defined in § 3 (22) of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended. Although the paper focuses 
on the U.S., the arguments apply equally to foreign governmental plans (although leg-
islation in other countries may foreclose some issues raised here). 
The Code refers to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. Interest covers 
all investment earnings including dividends and capital gains that are reflected in the 
actuarial value of assets. 
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funding method2 produces a range of possible contributions. Actuar-
ial conservatism generally is understood to mean a weighting of one or 
more assumptions intended to provide a safety margin, i.e., to deliber-
ately overstate recommended deposits to some extent.3 Conservatism 
can be introduced via an explicit margin added to recommended de-
posits, but implicit conservatism is much more common. The typical 
actuary knows that when he or she builds a model of expected future 
experience, he or she is entering the realm of speculation. The actu-
ary's crystal ball is no better than anyone else's, although the actuary's 
experience may give a greater appreciation than most of the effect of 
various alternative bases for speculation. 
When recommending contributions-when the actuary recommends 
accelerated funding, again increasing costs-the actuary often is look-
ing to ensure that the fund becomes as solvent as possible as quickly 
as possible. This emphasis on solvency must be tempered, however, 
because any additional dollar put into the pension plan may mean a 
reduction in the employer's investment opportunities. Reduced invest-
ment opportunities may lead to a reduction in expansion of job oppor-
tunities. 
Why do actuaries lean toward conservatism? To answer this ques-
tion, we will focus primarily on the economic assumptions (interest 
rate and salary progression, both heavily dependent on future infla-
tion) rather than on demographic assumptions (mortality, Withdrawal, 
etc.). This Simplifies the discussion, although much of the argument 
applies equally, mutatis mutandis, to demographic assumptions. 
2 Conservatism 
In my opinion, actuarial conservatism reflects the fact that while the 
actuary may not be expert in the economic disciplines required to accu-
rately forecast interest and inflation rates, the actuary's expertise is in 
risk analysis. The actuary understands that there are two separate fi-
2 At the risk of some loss of generality, the various actuarial cost methods-entry 
age normal, unit credit, etc.-will not be discussed in this paper. This is primarily to 
simplify the presentation, but it also reflects a conviction that detailed discussion of 
the mechanics of applying these methods to the broad issue discussed in this paper 
would result only in obscuring the main points. It also reflects the fact that many states 
mandate the funding method. 
3Not every margin or adjustment to an assumption evidences conservatism under 
this definition; for example, a projection of decreased mortality rates in future years 
(based on an expectation that mortality will continue to improve) or an interest rate 
below current earnings reflecting an expected reduction in market rates. 
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nancial risks to consider when building a model to represent a pension 
plan:4 (i) future inflation and the resulting investment yields will be 
underestimated so that when participants reach retirement the amount 
required to provide their benefits will be less than the amount assumed 
in the funding calculations and a surplus will develop; (ii) the comple-
mentary risk that future inflation and yields will be overestimated so 
that the actual cost of benefits at retirement will be greater than as-
sumed, i.e., there will be inadequate funding at retirement. These two 
alternatives are based on the fact that for the typical salary-related plan, 
comparable changes in the salary progression and interest assumption 
broadly cancel before retirement, but after retirement only interest is a 
factor, absent full cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). 5 
The first of these risks is, from the plan participant's point of view, 
much less serious than the second. Potential underfunding is a serious 
threat, especially when one remembers that no private sector enter-
prise has any guarantee of perpetual life; underfunding often becomes 
a problem at precisely the time that the plan sponsor is unable or un-
willing to make additional contributions. On the other hand, potential 
overfunding (especially in a high inflation environment where there is 
likely to be pressure to grant ad hoc COLAs and thus spend the sur-
plus) is a less serious problem.6 Also, the point where the interest 
rate standing alone becomes dominant after retirement is well in the 
future-when forecasting is hardest. For these reasons, most actuaries 
are comfortable with a conservative posture. 
Despite the clear thrust of the minimum funding standards of ERISA 
and the Code? against underfunding, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
has adopted maximizing government revenue as its main objective and 
seems hostile to the above approach. The IRS promotes high interest 
rates that have an inherent bias toward underfunding, especially in light 
of the statutory provision8 limiting (and for the highest paid and most 
expensive employees prohibiting) projection of salary increases in the 
4Jt is assumed that this model will avoid the obvious traps of inconsistent projections 
of future interest rates and salary increases; that is, that the wage and cost-of-Iiving 
inflation underlying these two key assumptions will be reasonably related. More im-
portantly, all of the above items reflect a fundamental assumption that inflation and 
yields are positively correlated over the long term. 
SMany, if not most, state pension plans have at least partial COLAs, sometimes on a 
discretionary or ad hoc basis, more often as part of the formula. 
GThe above analysis also supports a conservative approach to the demographic as-
sumptions; again, spending a surplus is far less of a problem than attempting to explain 
and deal with a deficiency. 
7ERISA §302 and Code §412, especially the recently enacted §302(d) and 412(1). 
BCode §404(1). 
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funding calculations. It bases this position on the language of ERISA9 
and the COdelO requiring the use of the actuary's best estimate in fund-
ing calculations, and (according to numerous IRS speakers at actuarial 
meetings) the IRS interprets that language to require a straight-down-
the-line interest projection with no bias toward conservatism. The case 
Vinson & Elkins v. Commissioner (1993)11 recently rejected this IRS po-
sition and strongly endorsed the use of conservative assumptions. The 
opinion notes that ERISA requires the actuary be retained "on behalf 
of the plan participants."12 Most actuaries regard this as a charge to 
act conservatively and to treat the second of the two risks as the larger 
threat to the interests of his or her statutory clients: the plan partici-
pants. 
I strongly endorse the actuarial attitude described above, i.e., a pen-
sion actuary should lean toward conservatism and should minimize 
the risk of a plan being unable to deliver promised benefits in the long 
run. 13 This view, like all such broad statements, is subject to some qual-
ification; it would be indefensible to be so conservative in an actuarial 
valuation that either benefits were held below an affordable level (and 
unreasonable surpluses were built up) or that contributions exceeded 
any reasonable level required to finance benefits. While most actuaries 
would accept the above proposition, there is a broad spectrum of opin-
ion about the appropriate definition of conservatism and the point at 
which it may become excessive. 
gCode §302(c)(3)(B). 
lOCode §412(c)(3)(B); the language also appears in Form 5500 Schedule B which the 
actuary must sign. 
II This case upheld the actuary's 5 percent interest assumption against an IRS attempt 
to impose a minimum of 8 percent. It explicitly recognized as a "particularly important" 
factor "the conservative nature of the actuarial assumption selection process;" also, it 
noted that: 
(i)f a financial analyst's predicted rate of return is higher than the actual 
rate earned, the investor simply earns less than he supposed he would 
earn (, but) (i)f an actuary makes the same mistake, there is a significant 
risk that the plan will become underfunded and the pensioners' full ben-
efits will be unpaid. 
The case dealt with small, one participant plans and, therefore, should be treated with 
some caution when applied to larger plans. 
12ERISA § 104(a)(5)(B). 
13This is to be distinguished from the situation in the early years of a plan when 
assets are being built and underfunding is part of the natural order of things and not 
to be condemned. Jones (1994) gives a lengthier discussion of this point. 
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3 Public Sector Plans 
For state or local government plans, I believe conservatism is no 
longer appropriate. Because we can assume that plan sponsors have 
perpetual life, 14 the overriding consideration should be equity between 
generations of taxpayers, not protection of participants. Participants 
are protected already by the impossibility (as a matter of practical pol-
itics) of benefit reductions. In many states, there is explicit constitu-
tional, statutory, or case-law protection. Many of the actuary's almost 
instinctive reactions of private sector experience do not hold in the 
public sector. 15 
Conservatism in assumptions is appropriate in the private sector be-
cause employers may go out of business. But why should contributions 
have a safety margin to guard against a nonexistent risk in the public 
sector? If today's taxpayers make contributions containing a safety 
margin, in all probability16 they are simply paying in advance contri-
butions more properly attributable to the next generation of taxpayers. 
Conservatism in assumptions, deliberately applied, means that average 
experience is expected to be more favorable than the assumptions over 
the long run; such an approach does not fit the public sector environ-
ment. When the objective is equity between generations of taxpayers, 
it is appropriate that the assumptions be unbiased so that long-run, 
average experience is as close as possible to the assumptions. 
This argument also applies to funding. In an ideal world all pension 
plans, both public and private, would be set at liberal levels from the 
beginning, avoiding any necessity for future benefit increases. Full con-
tributions would be made from the point where the first employee was 
14It is important to note that it is the plan sponsor, not the plan itself, that is assumed 
to have perpetual life. Public plans can be, and have been, terminated or frozen, but 
this possibility does not affect the argument of this paper. Also, as one referee pointed 
out, the argument would not hold for a very small local governmental unit that was on 
its own for pension purposes and not participating in a larger plan such as the state-
wide plans that many states maintain. Today's healthy little mining town could well 
be tomorrow's ghost town. 
15In public sector plans the choice of assumptions (and methods) often is not the 
actuary's domain. This contrasts with the situation under ERISA where the enrolled 
actuary is required to certify, on Form 5500, Schedule B, that the methods and as-
sumptions represent the actuary's "best estimate" of future experience. Therefore, 
recommendations that "the actuary" proceed in a particular way should be addressed 
to the actuarial decision maker: in some cases, this is the actuary, while in other cases 
it is a board of trustees acting on actuarial advice (or sometimes without, or in spite 
of, actuarial advice). This qualification applies throughout. 
16The expression "in all probability" is used because future experience inevitably will 
depart from projections and what is intended as today's conservative assumption could 
be tomorrow's reality. 
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hired; grants of past service would not be needed; and all plans would 
be fully funded at all times. All plans would have actuaries who could 
project future experience precisely; and plans would run indefinitely 
paying this year's cost plus expenses and avoid surpluses or deficien-
cies entirely. 
We do not live, however, in an ideal world. Pension plans-both pub-
lic and private-seldom start when the first employee is hired; plans 
usually are established later, often at modest levels, and are liberalized 
when the sponsor can afford additional benefits. Thus, most plan con-
tributions are paying the cost of benefits attributable to the current 
year (normal costs in actuarial parlance), additional catch-up amounts 
to fund the cost of benefits attributable to earlier periods (actuarial 
accrued liabilities or prior service costs), and additional contributions 
to provide a safety margin. Just as most actuaries select conserva-
tive assumptions, they also tend toward conservatism in recommending 
catch-up contributions. The objective of the actuary is to bring the plan 
to full funding and maximum benefit security as quickly as possible. I? 
Public sector plans also do not exist in an ideal world. Such plans 
were not funded from day one, and prior funding often may have been 
at relatively low levels as compared to private sector plans. Public sec-
tor plans, therefore, may have a large overhang of benefits attributable 
to prior years that must be provided eventually. Focusing on intergen-
erational equity, we should reflect that such funding did not happen 
in a way that imposes the resulting extra cost equally on all future 
taxpayers. IS This means that we should not require any later gener-
ation of taxpayers to pay high catch-up payments at the level required 
to meet the cost of these benefits in full. In actuarial terms, I suggest 
an open group aggregate funding approach where contributions pay 
only the amounts required to avoid an increase in plan liabilities as a 
percentage of payroll,I9 but that the actuary need not amortize these 
liabilities. In everyday language, future taxpayers should go some way 
17 Once again, this can be taken to extremes: it would be unreasonable to accelerate 
such payments to an extent such that benefit levels were unreasonably depressed in 
the early years. This is the major fallacy in legislation that treats maintaining a less-
than-fully-funded pension plan as an antisocial act and the sponsor of such a plan as 
a pariah. This point is developed more fully in Jones (1994). 
18There is, of course, no way to impose them on the prior taxpayers who initially 
consumed the services. 
19This is a lesser requirement than is called for in ERISA and also less than the tradi-
tional pre-ERISA standard of interest-only funding. Even that standard usually had an 
element of funding conservatism in that it maintained the liabilities at a constant level 
in dollars which usually meant a decrease as a percentage of payroll. In the private 
sector, however, there are declining (not to mention vanishing) industries, so there can 
be significant risks in such funding. This is not the case in the public sector. 
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toward making up the shortfall of interest earnings resulting from the 
shortfall of contributions in the early years, but need not make addi-
tional contributions to fully replace these missing contributions.2o 
The above recommendations cannot be absolute. In very difficult 
economic times, it may be appropriate to cut pension contributions21 
in order to avoid cuts in essential services. Intergenerational equity may 
have to take a back seat to harsh reality. On the other hand, it may be 
appropriate to fund at higher levels than are suggested above-in par-
ticular to fully or partly amortize the costs attributable to prior years-
if a plan sponsor is experiencing unusually good times. For example, 
this might be particularly desirable where a plan sponsor is enjoying 
high tax revenues from a nonrenewable natural resource. 22 
It is a fact of political life that in some situations it is necessary to 
make a gradual transition to the recommended funding levels over a 
period. This means that the shortfall described above would continue 
to increase, both in dollars and as a percentage of payroll, during the 
transition period. If so, there does not seem to be any good reason 
to treat such increases differently. The same is true of actuarial gains 
and losses. 23 All of these reflect events that cannot be carried back to 
the taxpayers on whose watch they arose-therefore, the costs of these 
events should be spread over all future generations. 
4 Summary 
The past and its effect on public sector pension plans are water over 
the dam. The public sector actuary's task is to look forward and to es-
20This would produce contributions that should remain essentially level as a percent-
age of payroll for the indefinite future; each generation of current and future taxpayers 
will pay its own costs and an equal share with other generations of prior shortfalls. 
The above proposal would not produce exactly level costs under various actuarial cost 
methods that might be used for a particular plan. The most direct method of comput-
ing a level-percentage-of-pay contribution would be an open group aggregate funding 
calculation producing a single percentage-of-pay recommended cost. These ideas on 
open group aggregate funding date back at least as far as Trowbridge (1952). 
21 Or, which amounts to the same thing, to lend plan assets back to the 
sponsor/employer. 
22It is also true that the ability of a state or municipality to borrow at low tax-exempt 
rates and to invest the proceeds in regular securities within its pension funds opens 
the possibility of a risk-free arbitrage gain, but this obviously raises questions beyond 
the scope of this paper, especially in the mind of bond analysts. 
23It is not inconsistent with the above, although it is not essential, for asset gains 
to be dampened by one of the common smoothing techniques used to determine an 
actuarial value of assets differing from pure market value before gains and losses are 
computed. 
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tablish (or recommend) a level of contributions that strikes a long-term 
balance between future generations of taxpayers. There is no reason to 
impose disproportionate costs on one group of current or future tax-
payers, regardless of whether these costs were created by a new plan, 
by an amendment liberalizing benefits under an existing plan, by past 
levels of funding or lack of funding, or by experience in gains or losses. 
Whenever possible, the objective of the actuarial exercise in the public 
sector should be to develop a level-percentage-of-payroll contribution, 
based on the most realistic possible assumptions, designed to remain 
level indefinitely. This is the way to reach intergenerational equity. 
Contributions above or below this level (however desirable they may be 
in the private sector in order to enhance participants' benefit security) 
are not appropriate in public sector actuarial work. 
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